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‘In Germany since unification, we witness a process of erosion rather than breakdown … 
Bargaining coverage in the private sector was more or less stable – around 70 percent or more – 
in West Germany before unification and is currently estimated at 59 percent in western and 36 
percent in eastern Germany. However, half of these non-organized firms nonetheless orient 
themselves toward the sector agreements and follow its basic features on pay and working time. 
This pushes the German coverage rate up by 10–15 percentage points.’ (Visser, 2006: 494) 
 
‘Since the mid-1990s, the German system of collective bargaining has been faced by a process of 
creeping erosion. While bargaining coverage has shown a steady decline, a far-reaching 
decentralization has increasingly undermined the system of multi-employer bargaining.’ (Bispinck, 
Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010: 2)  
 
  
Introduction  
It is now accepted that the traditional bargaining system in Germany based on sectoral 
bargaining, and underwritten by a framework of workplace codetermination, has been subject to 
erosion in recent years. Not only has the institutional base been shrinking since the 1990s but there has 
also been an increasing tendency toward decentralization. There is disputation as to the teleological 
outcome of this process. To begin with, while accepting that changes in the status quo ante were more 
than simply a veil behind which the operation of traditional regional and industry bargaining structures 
continued much as before, some observers contended that the existing structures permitted 
transformation without disruption (Frege, 2003; Thelen and van Wijnbergen, 2003; Streeck and Thelen, 
2004). Decentralization within sectoral bargaining was seen as proof of the system’s ability to adapt to 
change, while the sustaining role of political support (e.g. in the form of a new Works Constitution Act, 
designed to promote works councils) was also emphasized. The opposing view was that a system once 
renowned for its robustness and potential for promoting social cohesion was now actually destabilizing 
(see, for example, Hassel, 1999, 2002; Bispinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010). Quite apart from the 
decline in sectoral bargaining, its decentralization was viewed as a Trojan Horse and as inherently 
destabilizing. Such observers also noted that, despite the 2001 legislation, works councils were also in 
decline, thereby eroding the other pillar of the dual system. 
Although the latter view is largely unchanged in seeing the erosion of sectoral bargaining – 
again, both its decline and decentralization – as corrosive of the system as a whole, the former view has 
largely fallen out of favor. Thus, today one hears altogether less about path dependence, hybridization, 
and varieties of capitalism. The new approach has a basis in notions of segmentalism or dualism. It is 
well expressed in the work of Hassel (2014), who argues that German wage bargaining institutions have 
been transformed towards a competitively-driven model of wage regulation. Hassel distinguishes 
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between the emergence of an export-oriented high skill industry on the one hand and a low-cost 
domestic services sector on the other, and upon which the former depends to control labor costs. 
Although collaboration with labor – the hallmark of the old system is still practiced, this cooperation and 
coordination only applies to an inner core of largely manufacturing firms (see also Thelen, 2009) An 
increasingly dualist German economy has created an export oriented high-skill industry, depending on a 
domestic environment of low cost services to control labor costs, sustained by wage subsidies for the 
unskilled, and the lack of a minimum wage –   in addition to the contribution of offshoring.1   
At the price of some imprecision, we can equate both views2 with erosion, as manifested in 
falling collective bargaining coverage and diverging wage structures over time. In the present treatment 
we do not seek to distinguish between these theories but rather to note their central tendencies and ask 
whether or not erosion might not have been exaggerated under both scenarios if in fact many 
uncovered establishments continue to orient themselves toward sectoral agreements. On this view, 
although bargaining individually with their workers and formally part of the collective bargaining free 
zone, such orienting firms both shadow and buttress collective bargaining. While Visser (2006) himself 
had no doubts, there has been little discussion of the orientation phenomenon in the literature, still less 
of its frequency and extent of alignment. Specifically, we examine (a) the share of workers covered by 
establishments claiming to orient themselves toward sectoral agreements, and (b) the wages of 
orienting (and non-orienting) firms relative to those determined under sectoral bargaining. Central to 
the second theme is the construction of a counterfactual wage. For those leaving sectoral agreements 
this will be the wage prior to exit inflated by the growth in contractual earnings over a set interval. For 
those joining collective agreements it will be the wage before entry inflated by the increase in wages 
under individual bargaining. A comparison of actual with counterfactual wages will serve to determine 
whether or not the erosion thesis is overblown. 
To anticipate our findings, we report that there has been a growth in orientation at the very 
time that sectoral bargaining proper has declined – and seemingly continues to decline. We also report 
consistently higher average wages in cross section among the firmament of orienting firms vis-à-vis their 
nonorienting counterparts in the collective bargaining free zone, even if the former are distinctly lower 
than those determined under collective bargaining. But the evidence offers at best only moderate 
support for Visser’s argument that since orientation simply mimics collective bargaining the two can to 
all intents and purposes be regarded as one. First of all, even if close alignment were the order of the 
day, the joint frequency of sectoral bargaining and orientation is declining. Second of all, alignment is in 
fact only partial. That is, the actual wages of those establishments that exit collective bargaining but 
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claim to shadow collective agreements are statistically lower than the counterfactual wage – though 
significantly less so than for nonorienters. In the case of joiners, observed and counterfactual wages for 
orienting establishments are virtually identical, thereby offering indirect support for the orientation 
phenomenon. On balance, then, our findings discount Visser’s argument while at the same time 
suggesting that the erosion process has in practice been attenuated by orientation.  
 
Data 
Our data are extracted from the IAB Establishment Panel, or Betriebspanel. This is a nationally 
representative panel of establishments based on a stratified random sample of the population of all 
establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance (see Fischer et al., 2009). 
Currently, the stratification currently has a basis in 19 industries and 10 employee size classes. As of 
2013, the Panel encompassed more than 16,000 establishments. 
Respondents to the Panel questionnaire are asked questions on a wide set of issues, including 
the type of collective bargaining coverage, the number of employees in employment, and the wage bill. 
The questionnaire distinguishes between two types of collective bargaining: area-wide industry 
agreements, the dominant form of collective agreement, negotiated at sectoral level by the regional 
associations of employers and trade unions (the so-called Flächentarifverträge or 
Branchentarifverträge), and separate agreements based on negotiations between the firm and a 
union(s) (Firmentarifverträge). In addition, plants are asked to state if they do not practice collective 
bargaining, and since 1999 such establishments that individually bargain with their employees have 
been asked whether or not they nonetheless orient themselves to a sectoral agreement.3 In neither 
case, however, is the identity of the sectoral agreement in question disclosed so that the researcher 
cannot link firms to a specific tariff. 
 Furthermore, firm respondents are not asked to provide any information on the precise nature 
of the voluntarily applied contract terms. But we can exploit wage data to supplement the elusive 
nature of the orientation question in the survey. In particular, establishments are asked as of June 30 in 
each year to state the total sum of gross wages and salaries for that month (excluding the employer 
share of social security payments as well as holiday pay). Separate questions on the total number of 
workers employed at this qualifying date (net of trainees, temporary agency workers, and certain other 
residual categories) were used in conjunction with the share of part-time workers to compute the 
average bill per full-time equivalent employee. This is our raw measure of the establishment average 
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wage. Real wages (specifically, year 2000 wages) are used throughout, the inverse of the consumer price 
index being used as a deflator. 
Our selected observation window is 2000-2013, the beginning period being determined in part 
by changes in industrial classification that we wish to avoid having to deal with. But the 2009 changes in 
industrial classification were accommodated. In particular, since sectors in the 2000-2008 waves of the 
Panel are grouped using the NACE Revision 1.1, while in 2009-2013 the classification is based on NACE 
Revision 2, we opted to use the latter for all establishments coded under both systems. However for 
establishments in waves 2000-2008 but not 2009-2013, we used the ad hoc procedure of ‘the most 
likely transition,’ having a basis in the actual transitions (i.e. changes in sector classification from one 
system to another) for all those establishments that are coded under both systems. Sample industries 
and their 2-digit components, before and after the SIC changes of 2009 are provided in the Appendix. 
Finally, the longitudinal nature of the Establishment Panel allows us to track transitions into and 
out of collective agreements.4 These shifts in collective bargaining status provide the basis of our 
discussion of the wage implications of orientation (and nonorientation) to include the construction of 
counterfactual wages which is the last analytical step in the exercise. 
 
Findings  
1. The Extent of Orientation 
We first examine the frequency of orientation, beginning with the most aggregate level before turning 
to region and specific sector. In each case, we examine collective bargaining coverage/absence of 
coverage by the proportion of workers affected.5 Table 1 confirms the erosion of sectoral bargaining 
widely noted in the literature. Moreover, the seeming pause in decline for 2009 noted by some other 
observers does not appear to have persisted beyond that year (see also Ellguth and Kohaut, 2011). We 
observe a 17.8 percent fall in the share of employees covered by sectoral bargaining over the fourteen-
year sample period, as well as the suggestion of a modest uptick in firm-level bargaining at end of period 
after declining in 2010-2011. Observe that the share of employees in orienting plants has increased by 
35.2 percent – from 16.2 percent to 21.9 percent of all employees. However, there has been greater 
growth (25.6 percent) in the share of employees in non-orienting plants over the period. In short, even if 
we were uncritically to add the share of employees in covered and uncovered but orienting plants, the 
total would register a decline from 76.2 percent in 2000 to 71.2 percent in 2013. Sectoral bargaining is 
and continues to be in decline while orientation is increasing. Finally, the proportion of workers in 
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establishments practicing individual bargaining is also increasing, but as of end of period such individuals 
are outnumbered by their counterparts employed in orienting establishments.6 
(Table 1 near here) 
Table 2 disaggregates by broad region. Collective bargaining coverage rates by number of 
employees show the familiar pattern: sectoral bargaining is markedly lower in eastern than in western 
Germany (and the extent of the bargaining free sector correspondingly higher), while firm-level 
bargaining is higher but still of somewhat low frequency. Sectoral bargaining has declined over the 
sample period in both western and eastern Germany (by 17.0 percent and 25.7 percent, respectively) 
and the extent of the bargaining free sector is higher in eastern than western Germany (52.4 percent 
versus 39.7 percent of all employees at end period). Adding the numbers of employees covered by 
orientation to those covered by sectoral bargaining, however, again produces smaller declines in direct 
and what Visser would term ‘indirect’ sectoral bargaining of 5.5 percent in western Germany and 13.0 
percent in eastern Germany.  
(Table 2 near here) 
We next consider coverage rates in specific sectors of the economy. The coverage data in Table 
3 generally point to a decline in sectoral bargaining (other than in Business Services). The decline is more 
pronounced in some sectors (primarily Trade, Transport, and Finance and Manufacturing) than others 
(most notably Construction). By the same token, orientation seems to have grown with the highest 
increase occurring where sectoral bargaining has declined most. For example in Trade, Transport, and 
Finance where sectoral bargaining declined by 31.9 percent, orientation grew by 102.9 percent such 
that the two taken together decreased by 7.9 percent. In Manufacturing the respective changes were -
20.2 percent, +19.6 percent, and -11.2 percent. And in Other Services where sectoral bargaining fell by 
20.8 percent, orientation grew by 28.0 percent, yielding a decrease in joint coverage of 7.9 percent. 
(Table 3 near here) 
In sum, there has been some growth in orientation through time among firms practicing 
individual bargaining. But it remains the case that this growth has typically only partially compensated 
for the decline in sectoral bargaining proper, whether measured in terms of numbers of employees or 
establishments affected, although there is some heterogeneity by sector.7 
 
2. Wages under Orientation 
Recalling our earlier reservations as to the limited informational content of the orientation question in 
the IAB Establishment Panel, is it true that wages in firms claiming to shadow the relevant sectoral 
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agreements are in fact higher than in the rest of the collective bargaining free sector? To help answer 
this question, we will examine wage developments by type of collective agreement and by absence of 
collective agreement. (As before, firm-level bargaining is addressed only in passing.) We first consider 
the course of average wages (viz. the monthly real wage bill divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent workers; see the previous section) in each year of the sample period, both for the full cross 
section and for the subsample of permanent stayers. We then turn to examine changes in average 
wages over three consecutive years for those firms abandoning sectoral agreements and for those firms 
joining sectoral agreements, including the construction of their counterfactual wages.  
(Tables 4 and 5 near here) 
Mean unweighted real wages for our fourteen annual cross sections of data are provided in 
Table 4. It can be seen that real wages are unequivocally higher under collective bargaining than in its 
absence and that, with the exception of two years (i.e. 2000 and 2001), firm-level contracts are 
associated with the highest wages of all. In 2000 the average wage in uncovered non-orienting plants 
was 73.3 percent of that paid under the generality of sectoral agreements, and by 2013 this ratio had 
fallen to 66.4 percent. Corresponding values for orienting establishments were 80.7 percent and 75.1 
percent. At this level of aggregation, the seemingly most important development was the change in the 
relation between firm and sectoral bargaining: average wages under firm-level bargaining rose from 
99.4 percent to 107.4 percent of those paid under sectoral agreements over the sample period.  
Turning to the sample of permanent stayers in Table 5, much the same patterns are evident in 
the data. Thus, average real wages tend to be higher under firm-level agreements, especially in the 
second half of the period. In turn, wages in orienting firms uniformly exceed those in non-orienting 
firms: in 2000 the ratio of average wages in orienting (non-orienting) firms to those in plants observing 
sectoral agreements was 78.0 percent (72.6 percent). By 2013 the corresponding ratios were 72.7 
percent and 62.6 percent, respectively. 
Another way of looking at the evidence is to examine changes in wages attendant upon firms 
joining or leaving sectoral agreements according to their initial/subsequent status as either uncovered 
orienting or non-orienting firms – a type of unconditional difference-in-differences approach. Given the 
above evidence, orientation does not mean that wages are set at prevailing collective agreement levels. 
Subject to the caveat that we cannot link firms to specific sectoral agreements, our ultimate goal is to 
determine what switchers out of (into) collective agreements would have gained (lost) in wage increases 
had they not changed status. 
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Let us firstly briefly elaborate on our empirical strategy. The first step consists of selecting 
establishments that are observed for three consecutive years over our sample period, 2000-2013. Next, 
we divide this subsample into those establishments that are covered by a sectoral agreement over the 
entire sequence (call them ‘sectoral agreement stayers’); those that leave after the first year but who 
orient toward a sectoral agreement in the following two years (‘orienting leavers’), and those that 
seemingly abandon any contact with collective bargaining (‘non-orienting leavers’). We can also 
represent these three groups by the specific sequences (scb-scb-scb), (scb-orient-orient), and (scb-
nonorient-nonorient), respectively. Similarly, for sectoral agreement joiners, we have the sequences 
(orient-scb-scb) and (nonorient-scb-scb), where the former denotes the transition from orientation to 
sectoral agreement and the latter the transition from non-orientation to sectoral agreement coverage.8  
We label these two groups ‘orienting joiners’ and ‘non-orienting joiners’ and select two additional 
(control) groups of ‘orienting stayers’ and ‘non-orienting stayers.’ The latter are defined, respectively, by 
the sequences orient-orient-orient and nonorient-nonorient-nonorient.  
The next step is to compute and compare the wage growth profiles of the all groups over the full 
three-year sequence, t-2, t-1, and t. In particular, we are interested in comparing the wage 
developments/profiles of orienting and non-orienting leavers vis-à-vis sectoral agreement stayers on the 
one hand, and orienting and non-orienting joiners vis-à-vis orienting and non-orienting stayers on the 
other. Observe that we decided to look at three consecutive years of data, rather than just two, to 
reflect the possibility that the effect of leaving/joining may not be immediate. Indeed, we shall also 
present results from deploying four consecutive years of data, comprising two years before 
leaving/joining and two years with the new collective bargaining status. In this case, we have, in years t-
3, t-2, t-1, and t, the sequences (scb-scb-scb-scb), (scb-scb-orient-orient), (scb-scb-nonorient-nonorient), 
(nonorient-nonorient-scb-scb), and (orient-orient-scb-scb). By observing two consecutive years before 
switching, we hope to be able to detect any distinctive pre-exit collective agreement behavior, 
analogous to the Ashenfelter dip. All the empirical exercises will be carried out for the entire sample 
interval, 2000-2013, as well as for two shorter, 7-year intervals (i.e. 2000-2006, 2007-2013). We will also 
examine the robustness of our results using separate sub-samples of establishments with at least five 
employees, and from Manufacturing and Services as well. 
We begin by commenting on absolute wage levels observed in year t-2, t-1 and t for all selected 
groups vis-à-vis the wage data earlier observed in cross-section. The goal here is to find the extent to 
which the initial wage level of sectoral agreement stayers differs from the wage observed for the entire 
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group of establishments covered by a sectoral agreement; and similarly for sectoral agreement leavers 
and joiners.  
(Table 6 near here)  
Table 6 provides evidence on beginning-period wages for the different groups of stayers and 
movers: panel (a) for the three-year sequence, and panel (b) for the four-year sequence. Here the 
relevant comparison is with Table 4. Observe firstly that wages among sectoral agreement stayers in the 
first column and row of Table 6 (panel a) are slightly above the average wage level that can be calculated 
from Table 4 (i.e. €2,202 in the first column as compared with an average of €2,118 across all cross-
sections shown in the first column of Table 4). Next, sectoral agreement leavers seemingly have lower 
wages in the base year than the average sectoral agreement member. For their part, joiners that 
previously did not practice orientation had lower wages than their counterparts that did so. 
Interestingly, the wage structure given in the second panel – the four-year case – closely accords with 
the first panel. Hierarchies are preserved. Orienting firms have higher base wages than non-orienting 
firms irrespective of whether they are stayers or movers. 
(Figure 1 near here) 
The wage pattern over time and across the selected ‘control’ and ‘treatment’ groups are 
presented in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts wage growth for leavers and joiners versus sectoral and 
non-sectoral agreement stayers in the three-period sequence and for the entire interval, 2000-2013. 
Sectoral agreement stayers apparently earn higher wage increases over the period than do sectoral 
agreement leavers. This is not an unexpected finding given our earlier results to the effect that it is 
better to be covered than not covered, subject to the caveat that we are observing an average contract, 
not the specific contract being followed (or abandoned). And despite low real wage growth over our 
sample period, it is clear that those leavers that practice orientation do stay closer to the growth pattern 
of stayers than those who leave and do not. For its part, joining a collective agreement seems to pay off, 
with newly-covered establishments enjoying a higher wage increase than both sectoral and non-sectoral 
agreement stayers. The case of non-orienting joiners, who record the highest wages growth, is as 
anticipated given that their starting wage levels are the lowest of all. 
(Figure 2 near here)  
Figure 2 presents the results for the four-year sequence, where it will be recalled that we are we 
are controlling for an extended two-year (i.e. t-3 and t-2) pre-transition period. The gains from being 
covered throughout are seemingly transparent. Stayers record a cumulative wage growth of 
approximately 1 percent by the fourth year, which is conspicuously higher than for leavers, especially for 
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non-orienting leavers who record a 6 percent loss. In the case of joiners, the figure suggests that their 
lower initial wage increases are followed by a comparatively rapid advance in wages after joining.  
We turn in conclusion to the critical issue of whether workers in establishments leaving a 
sectoral agreement would have enjoyed higher wages had they not switched. Ultimately, we will be 
interested in determining whether there is evidence supporting the thesis that the decline in coverage 
has generated an increasing wage gap with no obvious offsetting role played by orientation. 
 In the first place, and taking the case of leavers, note that the quasi-experimental exercise to be 
carried out amounts to constructing a meaningful counterfactual wage 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗  for each establishment j in 
the selected ‘treatment’ group and then to compare the corresponding mean, 𝑤𝑡
∗, with the observed 
wage mean in the same group (or 𝑤𝑡). In order to obtain 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗   we use the wage growth rate, 𝑔𝑐, of the 
corresponding control group of sectoral agreement stayers, so that we have 𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝑤𝑗𝑡−2(1 + 𝑔𝑐). In 
this framework, if non-orienting leavers obtain a counterfactual wage that is statistically higher than the 
observed wage, while orienting leavers do not, we can infer that the erosion thesis is not overblown, 
since this evidence would suggest that orientation after exiting from a sectoral agreement plays a (fully) 
offsetting role. A similar exercise will be carried out for the group of joiners. In this latter case, however, 
we will need to form two distinct counterfactual wage growth rates for orienting and non-orienting 
stayers, according to the selected treatment group (namely, orienting and non-orienting joiners, 
respectively).  
This exercise is of course grounded in the premise that although the set of leavers (either 
orienting or non-orienting) may not be entirely similar to the control group of sectoral agreement 
stayers – as shown in Table 6 above – there is no reason to believe that had these leavers not switched 
they would fail to obtain approximately the same wage increase as any sectoral agreement stayer. In 
other words, low-paying establishments or not, had leavers not switched they would tend to obtain the 
collectively-agreed wage growth set for all members. 
(Table 7 near here) 
Panels (a) and (b) of Table 7 show the results of this exercise for establishments that are 
observed over three and four consecutive years, respectively. To illustrate our computations for the 
former, we note that the value of €1,781 reported in the second column and second row of panel (a) is 
the counterfactual mean wage 𝑤𝑡
∗ over all orienting leavers, which is given by (in Euros) 𝑤𝑡
∗ = 𝑤𝑡−2 (1 +
𝑔𝑐) (or 1,781 = 1,764 ∗ 2,224/2,202), where 𝑤𝑡−2 = 1,764 is the pre-exit mean wage for  orienting 
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leavers and 𝑔𝑐 = 𝑤𝑡/𝑤𝑡−2 − 1 = 2,224/2,202 − 1  is the control group average growth rate, both 
obtained by using the corresponding average values reported in panel (a) of Table 6. 
Clearly, the difference between the observed and the counterfactual wage is sufficiently large 
for a mean comparison test to confirm (at the 0.01 level) that the actual wage is statistically lower than 
the counterfactual wage for both orienting and non-orienting leavers. Had orientation a full impact on 
those establishments that chose to shadow an existing sectoral agreement, only non-orienting leavers 
would have a counterfactual wage higher than the observed wage. By the same token, the difference 
between observed and counterfactual wages is much larger for non-orienting leavers than for their 
orienting counterparts (at -€129 and -€41, respectively). The fourth column in panel (a) shows that the 
difference across the two groups of leavers is approximately €90 in favor of orienting leavers, a sizeable 
and highly statistically significant gap. In other words, although exiting a sectoral agreement reduces 
establishment wages for all leavers, there is nevertheless a material orientation effect that reduces the 
negative impact of leaving for employees of firms that choose to orient.  
Panel (b) of Table 7 in turn presents the results for establishments observed over four – rather 
than three – consecutive years. The evidence points very much in the same direction as before, with the 
null hypothesis in the third column being rejected at the 0.05 level for orienting and non-orienting 
leavers alike. In comparison with panel (a), the difference between observed and counterfactual wages 
is about the same magnitude for orienting leavers. For non-orienters, however, the difference is larger. 
As a result, the comparison across the two groups in the fourth column yields a larger (absolute) 
difference of approximately €130 (rather than €90, in panel (a)), a gap that is again statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level.  
(Table 8a near here) 
Do these findings still hold if we restrict the sample to larger establishments? We present a 
parallel analysis for establishments with at least 5 employees in Table 8a. We note parenthetically that a 
larger establishment-size threshold would cause the number of collective agreement transitions to drop 
materially.9 One main conclusion of this exercise is that despite an across-the-board increase in mean 
wages – attendant upon very small establishment being dropped from the sample –  there is every 
indication albeit now at a reduced significance level that both groups of leavers again have their wages 
reduced in comparison with the ‘alternative’ wage each would have recorded had they not left a 
sectoral agreement. In turn, from the fourth column of the table, it is clear that that the reduction is also 
larger for non-orienting than for orienting leavers – this time by a margin of approximately €80. 
 (Table 8b near here) 
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Table 8b repeats the analysis for the two separate sectors of Manufacturing and Services. Given 
the evidence in Table 8a, we ran the one-tailed mean comparison test only for the full sample of 
establishments (i.e. those with at least one employee). Three conclusions are in order. First, for the 
group of sectoral agreement stayers, observed wages are approximately the same in the two selected 
sectors (and similarly for orienting and non-orienting leavers). Second, the null hypothesis, in the third 
column of the table, is again rejected for both groups of leavers in each sector (at the 0.05 level). Finally, 
the gap across the two groups, shown in the fourth column, is again larger (in absolute value) for non-
orienting than for orienting leavers; approximately €120 in Manufacturing and €70 for Services. 
(Table 8c near here) 
We next consider in Table 8c results for the two sub-periods, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013, again 
for establishments with at least one employee.10 Sample size inevitably falls, but the goal here is to offer 
some indicative evidence on whether there is any analytical gain from looking at a shorter interval, in 
which establishments are presumably more likely to maintain their intrinsic characteristics constant. 
This approach also allows us to control in a rough and ready way for different macroeconomic 
environments that might impact sectoral agreement transitions. The main finding seems to hold again, 
especially for 2007-2013. For 2000-2006, the null hypothesis in the third column is only rejected for the 
group of non-orienting leavers. In any event, we do find for both sub-periods that non-orienting leavers 
are at a relative wage disadvantage as the corresponding wage loss (in comparison with the ‘alternative’ 
wage) is always larger than that observed for those who orientate, at roughly €90 and €130 as can be 
seen from the fourth and eighth columns of the table, respectively. 
We turn finally to an indirect procedure. Returning to Table 7, the last four rows provide 
information on those joining sectoral agreements according to whether they were previously orienters 
or nonorienters. Here, if sectoral agreement coverage is indeed beneficial to worker wages, then 
switching from non-coverage to coverage should imply a higher wage. At the same time, we would 
anticipate the difference between observed and counterfactual wages to be larger for non-orienting 
joiners than for orienting joiners. In other words, since the respective control groups are non-orienting 
and orienting stayers, respectively, if orientation has an impact on wages, we would expect joining after 
orientation to yield a smaller wage effect than joining after non-orientation. Put differently, our 
presumption is that the null hypothesis is more likely to be rejected in the case non-orienting joiners 
than in the case of orienting joiners. 
As shown in the seventh row of the table, third column, there is every indication that joining is 
particularly favorable for non-orienting joiners as the counterfactual wage is statistically smaller than 
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the observed wage at the 0.05 level. For orienting joiners, in the fifth row, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis – in other words, had orienting joiners not joined a sectoral agreement their (counterfactual) 
wage would be approximately the same. The result in the fourth column confirms that the difference 
between observed and counterfactual wages is larger for non-orienting than for orienting joiners (at 
approximately €70). In comparison with the results obtained for leavers, it follows therefore that the 
presence of an orientation effect is perhaps more transparent among the subset of joiners.  
The results for orienting joiners observed for four consecutive years, in panel (b), seemingly 
confirms the presence of a tangible orientation effect as observed and counterfactual wages are not 
statistically different for this group. For non-orienting joiners we also find that the null hypothesis is 
rejected, which implies that the difference (𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡
∗) across the two groups is not statistically different 
from zero (see the fourth column of the table). That said, we view the latter result as an artifact of 
sample size; comparing panels (a) and (b) the sample of joiners is reduced by roughly three-quarters 
(namely from 1,908 to 537). 
The presence of a sizeable orientation effect in the subset of orienting joiners is confirmed in the 
sensitivity exercises – see the results in the fifth rows, and third columns of Tables 7 and 8. As can be 
seen, in no case is the null hypothesis for orienting joiners rejected, indicating that actual and 
counterfactual wages are very much aligned for this group of joiners. For non-orienting joiners (seventh 
rows), it is perhaps surprising that the evidence of wage gain is not stronger: only in three out of five 
cases is the observed wage statistically higher than the counterfactual wage and in no case at 0.01 level. 
Further, the mean comparison test across the two groups of joiners, in the fourth column, rejects the 
null in just two out of five cases. Summarizing the findings from Table 7 (and 8a through 8c), then, it 
seems that the erosion thesis might have been exaggerated. Thus, for the subset of leavers although 
alignment with sectoral agreements was certainly incomplete, workers in orienting plants nevertheless 
earned a wage much closer to the alternative (or counterfactual) wage than their did counterparts in 
nonorienting establishments. The indirect evidence was in some sense stronger in that observed wages 
in establishments that oriented themselves toward sectoral agreements were seemingly more closely 
aligned prior to joining, recording/requiring smaller wage advances than others in this group of joiners 
that had not previously oriented. 
 
Conclusion 
The ambiguity concerning orientation, the shadowing of sectoral collective agreements by 
uncovered firms that formally practice individual bargaining alone, is two-fold. First, and least opaque, is 
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the question of its frequency. That is, the IAB Establishment Panel directly inquires of firm respondents 
in the collective bargaining free zone whether or not they informally follow the terms of an industry-
wide agreement. Despite this data availability, however, scant attention has been accorded it in the 
wage literature and unaccountably even less in the much larger body of empirical work devoted to the 
erosion thesis. In the present paper, we have sought to remedy this information deficit by providing 
several time series on the extent of orientation. Second, but much more difficult to discern, is the extent 
to which firms professing to informally follow sectoral agreements do so in practice. This is an issue akin 
pattern bargaining, to resurrect reference to an Anglo-Saxon literature. Full investigation of this issue 
would involve examination of detailed bargaining constellations (see Addison and Burton, 1977). Our 
approach here can only be indirect as we lack information on the actual sectoral agreements in play. 
Instead, we compare average wages and changes in wages for three groups: sectoral bargainers on the 
one hand and individual bargainers, comprising orienters and nonorienters, on the other. 
What do we find? Apart from confirming that industry-wide collective bargaining has been in 
retreat in Germany, this update also suggests that it continues to decline. That said, there is every 
indication that the informal following of sectoral agreements is not merely commonplace but also on 
the increase. There is even the suggestion that it may be increasing most where sectoral bargaining is 
most in decline, even if at this descriptive level (i.e. simply lumping together formal and informal 
sectoral bargaining) it is seldom sufficient to reverse the decline. Turning to the issue of wage alignment, 
there is evidence that those paid according to sectoral agreements earn the most and that some way 
behind them come orienting firms that pay somewhat more than their non-orienting counterparts. For 
their part, and at purely descriptive level, sectoral agreement stayers earn higher wage increases over 
the period than do sectoral agreement leavers, while orienting leavers stay closer to the growth pattern 
of stayers than non-orienting leavers.  Not surprisingly, for non-orienting joiners we found that newly-
covered establishments reveal a higher wage growth than both sectoral agreement and non-sectoral 
agreement stayers, while orienting joiners only perform better than non-orienting stayers.  
But is there any strong statistical evidence to suggest that workers in those establishments 
quitting sectoral bargaining would have enjoyed higher wages had they not switched? And is there any 
distinct pattern distinguishing orienting from non-orienting leavers that might permit one to conclude 
that sectoral agreements are not after all heading toward oblivion? We sought to answer such questions 
by constructing counterfactual wages for all relevant treatment groups. The bare conclusion for both 
orienting and non-orienting leavers is that counterfactual wages are visibly higher than observed wages. 
Despite this outcome, however, the deficit between actual and counterfactual wages is distinctly lower 
15 
 
for orienting than nonorienting leavers, suggesting that orientation does achieve closer correspondence 
with collectively bargained wages. The results for joiners offer indirect support for this version of the 
orientation thesis. That is, compared with their counterparts that remain uncovered there is little wage 
advantage from now formally following a sectoral agreement among the ranks of orienting joiners, while 
the converse is the case for nonorienting joiners who experience somewhat higher wage gains than 
those they leave behind.  
Nevertheless, the bottom line remains the finding that in neither frequency nor remuneration is 
the compensation offered by orientation other than partial. Orientation as practiced offers organized 
bargaining at best a temporary respite from the forces of erosion. It is therefore appropriate that the 
research focus now shift back toward a reconsideration of the causes and consequences of the decline 
in sectoral bargaining. An important contemporary issue covering both aspects is European crisis 
management involving fundamental structural reforms aimed at improving national competitiveness. A 
recent report prepared by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG ECFIN) offers a stark vision of the future of collective bargaining (European Commission, 
2012: 102). The report calls for a general decentralization of wage setting  and collective bargaining, the 
introduction of greater flexibility through the opportunity to derogate at workplace level from sectoral 
agreements (coupled with enabling labor code/legal changes), and limitations on the scope for the 
extension of collective agreements to nonsignatory employers. (It also recommends a reduction in 
collective bargaining coverage, as well as an overall reduction on the wage-setting power of unions.) 
Observe that each of these changes had earlier been introduced in Germany. Arguably, the ‘new’ 
German model is being used as a blueprint for reforms to labor market policy to be followed by 
European nations in straightened economic circumstances as conditionality for obtaining loans and the 
purchase of government bonds under terms set by the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, and the International Monetary Fund (or Troika).  The payoff is said to be improved 
competitiveness through a reduction in wages and unit labor costs, and here German economic 
performance will strike many observers as particularly compelling. Indeed, recent study by Dustmann et 
al. (2014) attributes the dramatic improvements in that nation’s employment and 
competitiveness during and subsequent to the Great Recession exclusively to its industrial relations 
changes. However, apart from the simple correlation of rising wage inequality and falling union coverage 
(and density), the authors do not examine the consequences of changes in bargaining structure over 
their sample period in any detail. 
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The forces making for decentralization in the past – competitive wage setting arrangements –  
seem set to continue, partly as a result of conscious policy. From this perspective, the radical 
decentralization of collective bargaining in the crisis nations is unlikely to be restricted to those 
countries. Schulten and Müller (2013) speak of an increasing divergence between the crisis countries 
and the core countries (including Germany) but their argument is predicated on the controversial notion 
of controlled decentralization having allowed German collective bargaining institutions to weather the 
storm. This is a further example of complications raised by the lack of consensus on the erosion thesis, 
and helps explain the relevance of the present paper. Our contribution sought formally to examine one 
component of the decentralization/erosion debate by determining whether sectoral bargaining was 
(increasingly) undergirded by a supportive system of ‘implicit sectoral bargaining,’ such that the 
observed decline in organized bargaining might be seriously overstated. We found that not to be the 
case and the evidence consistent at most with a modest attenuation of the erosion in collective 
bargaining. With this potentially important qualification out of the way, as it were, the way is now clear 
for a new research focus on changes in wages and the wage distribution following shifts in collective 
bargaining status as well as the effects of opening clauses (and local pacts) on wages, firm performance, 
and on the interplay between works councils and trade unions.   
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ENDNOTES 
1. For a discussion of declining collective bargaining frameworks and the pressures on the terms and 
conditions of employment through privatization, offshoring, outsourcing, European integration, and 
neoliberal reforms, see Doellgast, 2012; Doellgast and Greer, 2007; Höpner and Schäfer, 2008; Holst, 
Nachtwey, and Dörre, 2010; Lillie, 2010; Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Emmenegger et al., 2012.  
2. There are alternative representations of the status quo. These are primarily the exhaustion thesis 
(Streeck, 2010) on the one hand, indicating a singular trend towards liberalization, and notions of 
revitalization on the other (Haipeter, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). 
3. This part of the questionnaire inquiring about collective bargaining status also asks firms following a 
multi-employer or single-employer agreement whether or not they paid higher wages than laid down in 
the respective tariff agreement. We do not use this information, but for an analysis of this wage cushion, 
see Jung and Schnabel (2009). 
4. We will also look at those establishments that are observed in every single wave of the Panel – so-
called ‘permanent stayers’ – alongside unrestricted cross sections of the data. 
5. Coverage data by establishment share corresponding to this table (see below) and all other 
descriptive tables are available upon request. 
6.  Although not shown in the table, coverage data based on the proportion of establishments rather 
than employment share confirm the erosion of sectoral bargaining. Specifically, we observe a 32.2 
percent fall in the number of establishments covered by sectoral bargaining over the fourteen-year 
sample period. In turn, the share of orienting plants has increased by 36.0 percent – from 22.2 percent 
to 30.2 percent of all plants – whereas that of non-orienting plants has grown at 17.6 percent over the 
period. Adding the share of orienting plants to those formally practicing sectoral bargaining, indicates a 
decline from 63.5 percent in 2000 to 58.2 percent in 2013. As expected, greater shares of employees 
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than establishments are covered by sectoral bargaining given the higher incidence of collective 
bargaining in larger firms – and conversely for the bargaining free zone.  
7. The decline in sectoral bargaining and the corresponding increase in the collective bargaining free 
zone is observed across all (establishment) size groups. For example, in establishments with less than 50 
(with at least 250) employees the share of workers covered by a sectoral agreement declined by 14.5 
(8.2) percentage points. The corresponding increase in the share of workers in non-orienting 
establishments is 6.6 and 2.4 percentage points, respectively. Accordingly, the fall in sectoral agreement 
coverage in the very broadest sense (lumping together the share of workers in covered and orienting 
establishments) is about the same magnitude in two selected establishment-size categories, at 6 to 8 
percentage points, respectively. Again, full results are available upon request. 
8. The sequences (scb-fcb-fcb) and (fcb-scb-scb), where ‘fcb’ denotes the presence of a firm agreement, 
have also been ignored in the literature and are strictly outside of the remit of the present paper. As a 
practical matter, the number of transitions is very much lower here. 
9. Note also that we refrain from considering the four-year case here because the comparisons would be 
distorted by sharp falls in sample sizes. 
10. Results for establishment with at least five employees are available upon request; and they are very 
similar. 
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TABLE 1 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE BY EMPLOYMENT (ALL GERMANY), 2000-2013, WEIGHTED DATA  
 
 
Year 
 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
 
Firm Agreement 
Not Covered by a 
Collective Agreement but 
Oriented Toward One 
Neither Covered by a 
Collective Agreement nor 
Oriented 
2000 60.0 7.8 16.2 16.0 
2001 60.5 8.4 16.4 14.7 
2002 59.8 7.9 16.7 15.6 
2003 59.1 8.2 17.2 15.4 
2004 57.7 7.9 16.8 17.6 
2005 56.2 8.1 17.1 18.6 
2006 54.3 9.0 18.5 18.2 
2007 53.4 8.2 20.0 18.4 
2008 52.9 8.7 19.7 18.7 
2009 52.7 9.5 19.4 18.4 
2010 52.6 8.4 19.4 19.7 
2011 50.9 8.1 21.2 19.8 
2012 50.4 8.3 21.2 20.0 
2013 49.3 8.7 21.9 20.1 
 Note: The raw sample includes all establishments with at least one employee.  
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TABLE 2 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE BY EMPLOYMENT FOR WESTERN AND EASTERN GERMANY, 2000-
2013, WEIGHTED DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm 
Agreement 
Not 
Covered by 
a 
Collective 
Agreement 
but 
Oriented 
Not 
Covered by 
a 
Collective 
Agreement 
and not 
Oriented 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm 
Agreement 
Not 
Covered by 
a 
Collective 
Agreement 
but 
Oriented 
Neither 
Covered by 
a 
Collective 
Agreement 
nor 
Oriented  
2000 63.1 7.2 14.8 14.9 47.5 10.0 21.9 20.5 
2001 64.0 7.5 14.9 13.6 45.7 12.3 22.9 19.1 
2002 63.4 7.0 15.4 14.3 44.4 11.9 22.6 21.2 
2003 62.6 7.4 16.0 14.0 43.9 12.0 22.3 21.8 
2004 61.3 7.0 15.8 15.9 42.1 11.7 21.2 25.1 
2005 59.4 7.3 16.1 17.2 42.1 11.6 21.7 24.7 
2006 57.4 8.0 17.8 16.8 40.8 13.1 21.8 24.3 
2007 56.3 7.2 19.4 17.2 40.6 12.8 22.8 23.8 
2008 55.7 7.9 19.1 17.3 40.1 12.4 22.6 24.8 
2009 55.8 8.8 18.4 17.0 38.5 12.9 23.8 24.8 
2010 56.0 7.4 18.4 18.1 37.1 12.7 23.6 26.5 
2011 53.8 7.3 20.3 18.5 37.5 11.7 25.5 25.3 
2012 53.4 7.5 20.5 18.6 36.7 12.4 24.7 26.3 
2013 52.4 7.9 21.2 18.5 35.3 12.4 25.1 27.3 
Note: See Table 1. 
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TABLE 3 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE BY EMPLOYMENT FOR DIFFERENT SECTORS, 2000-2013, 
WEIGHTED DATA  
  
 
 
Year 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm 
Agreement 
Not Covered by a 
Collective 
Agreement but 
Oriented 
Neither Covered by 
a Collective 
Agreement nor 
Oriented 
Manufacturing 2000 63.4 6.7 18.4 11.4 
2001 62.8 9.4 17.2 10.5 
2002 63.7 8.4 17.7 10.3 
2003 63.2 9.1 17.0 10.7 
2004 61.5 7.4 18.0 13.2 
2005 57.9 9.3 18.9 14.0 
2006 55.2 11.1 20.9 12.8 
2007 54.7 9.9 21.3 14.0 
2008 53.5 10.1 21.8 14.6 
2009 53.5 10.5 20.7 15.4 
2010 52.0 11.4 20.8 15.8 
2011 50.6 10.2 22.4 16.8 
2012 50.1 10.2 23.1 16.6 
2013 50.6 12.1 22.0 15.2 
Construction 2000 70.7 4.1 17.3 7.9 
2001 69.0 4.2 17.3 9.5 
2002 68.2 3.8 20.0 8.0 
2003 67.6 4.0 20.1 8.3 
2004 67.7 3.6 18.8 9.8 
2005 67.5 3.4 18.5 10.7 
2006 67.4 4.2 19.0 9.4 
2007 67.9 3.6 17.6 10.9 
2008 64.9 5.0 16.8 13.2 
2009 69.7 3.5 15.2 11.7 
2010 67.8 2.7 17.1 12.4 
2011 63.4 2.8 22.0 11.7 
2012 66.0 2.9 19.6 11.5 
2013 65.1 3.1 20.6 11.2 
Trade/Transport/Finance 2000 62.6 7.9 13.6 15.8 
2001 64.1 8.9 14.6 12.4 
2002 61.6 7.6 16.3 14.6 
2003 60.2 10.0 15.9 13.9 
2004 58.2 9.3 16.9 15.7 
25 
 
2005 55.3 7.9 18.0 18.8 
2006 51.6 7.8 21.0 19.6 
2007 49.7 6.9 23.5 19.9 
2008 47.8 7.2 23.6 21.4 
2009 48.3 8.6 23.1 20.0 
2010 47.1 6.4 23.6 22.9 
2011 44.7 6.3 26.8 22.2 
2012 44.4 7.8 25.4 22.5 
2013 42.6 6.5 27.6 23.3 
Business Services 2000 35.7 8.6 20.9 34.8 
2001 33.8 8.2 22.6 35.4 
2002 33.3 5.3 21.9 39.5 
2003 32.7 5.8 24.4 37.0 
2004 39.4 7.8 17.8 35.0 
2005 40.9 6.8 17.8 34.4 
2006 41.0 8.9 17.7 32.4 
2007 44.7 6.7 19.0 29.6 
2008 44.8 7.3 17.0 31.0 
2009 44.0 8.3 18.4 29.3 
2010 46.3 6.5 16.9 30.3 
2011 46.5 4.8 18.8 30.0 
2012 46.4 5.1 18.4 30.1 
2013 44.0 4.4 19.2 32.5 
Other Services 2000 53.8 7.4 19.3 19.6 
2001 56.5 6.0 19.7 17.9 
2002 55.3 7.9 18.8 18.0 
2003 53.3 7.0 20.7 19.1 
2004 51.4 6.7 19.0 22.9 
2005 50.4 8.1 18.8 22.7 
2006 50.9 8.3 18.9 21.9 
2007 47.0 8.9 21.5 22.6 
2008 49.6 8.3 21.8 20.3 
2009 46.3 10.7 22.0 21.0 
2010 47.3 8.5 22.2 22.1 
2011 45.7 9.3 22.9 22.1 
2012 44.5 8.9 24.1 22.5 
2013 42.6 10.7 24.7 22.1 
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TABLE 4 
REAL WAGE BILL PER EMPLOYEE, 2000-2013, UNWEIGHTED DATA 
 
 
Year 
Sectoral Agreement Firm Agreement 
Not Covered by a 
Collective Agreement 
but Oriented 
Neither Covered by a 
Collective Agreement 
nor Oriented 
2000 2,125 2,113 1,716 1,558 
2001 2,139 2,114 1,727 1,640 
2002 2,188 2,219 1,802 1,668 
2003 2,164 2,186 1,759 1,628 
2004 2,174 2,236 1,766 1,570 
2005 2,172 2,246 1,720 1,518 
2006 2,154 2,305 1,727 1,535 
2007 2,100 2,198 1,648 1,443 
2008 2,067 2,141 1,620 1,429 
2009 2,053 2,152 1,613 1,419 
2010 2,077 2,212 1,606 1,403 
2011 2,074 2,222 1,585 1,392 
2012 2,083 2,242 1,603 1,409 
2013 2,086 2,240 1,566 1,386 
Notes: The reported figures are per full-time equivalent employee, where a part-time worker is taken to 
be one-half a full-time worker. Real wages (in Euros) refer to year 2000, and were obtained using the 
inverse of the CPI as a deflator. 
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TABLE 5 
REAL WAGE BILL PER EMPLOYEE FOR PERMANENT STAYERS, 2000-2013, UNWEIGHTED DATA 
 
 
Year 
Sectoral Agreement Firm Agreement 
Not Covered by a 
Collective Agreement 
but Oriented 
Neither Covered by a 
Collective Agreement 
nor Oriented 
2000 2,071 2,059 1,615 1,503 
2001 2,044 2,008 1,620 1,492 
2002 2,094 2,067 1,671 1,465 
2003 2,127 2,129 1,674 1,486 
2004 2,116 2,091 1,692 1,482 
2005 2,142 2,126 1,656 1,451 
2006 2,154 2,188 1,665 1,456 
2007 2,145 2,180 1,634 1,491 
2008 2,122 2,196 1,630 1,468 
2009 2,147 2,157 1,547 1,442 
2010 2,206 2,249 1,624 1,442 
2011 2,193 2,248 1,630 1,455 
2012 2,232 2,210 1,669 1,414 
2013 2,251 2,358 1,636 1,410 
Note: See Table 4. 
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TABLE 6 
REAL WAGE BILL PER EMPLOYEE FOR SECTORAL AGREEMENT STAYERS, LEAVERS, AND JOINERS, 2000-
2013, UNWEIGHTED DATA 
(a) Establishments Observed for Three Consecutive Years 
 t-2 t-1 t 
Sectoral agreement stayers 2,202 2,212 2,224 
Orienting leavers 1,764 1,754 1,740 
Non-orienting leavers 1,518 1,458 1,404 
Orienting joiners 1,774 1,762 1,777 
Non-orienting joiners 1,435 1,460 1,489 
Orienting stayers 1,755 1,758 1,762 
Non-orienting stayers 1,528 1,521 1,516 
(a) Establishments Observed for Four Consecutive Years 
 t-3 t-2 t-1 t 
Sectoral agreement stayers 2,218 2,230 2,242 2,249 
Orienting leavers 1,841 1,816 1,830 1,794 
Non-orienting leavers 1,533 1,597 1,522 1,442 
Orienting joiners 1,748 1,749 1,721 1,738 
Non-orienting joiners 1,373 1,371 1,373 1,422 
Orienting stayers 1,777 1,781 1,782 1,785 
Non-orienting stayers 1,549 1,538 1,536 1,532 
Notes: In panel (a) the selected establishments were observed in the three consecutive years t-2, t-1 and 
t. The reported values are the mean real wages per full-time equivalent in year 2000 Euros (see Table 4).  
To illustrate, the value reported in the first cell of panel (a) (viz. 2,202 Euro) is the t-2 average over all 
sectoral agreement stayers observed consecutively in 2000, 2001 and 2002; 2001, 2002 and 2003; …; 
and 2011, 2012 and 2013 (or in all or some of these three-year periods). The same applies for panel (b), 
except that in this case we have sequences of four consecutive years.  
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TABLE 7 
OBSERVED AND COUNTERFACTUAL ESTABLISHMENT WAGES FOR SECTORAL AGREEMENT LEAVERS AND 
JOINERS, 2000-2013 
 𝑤𝑡 𝑤𝑡
∗ 
Mean comparison 
(within groups) 
Mean comparison 
(across groups) 
N 
(a) Establishments Observed for Three Consecutive Years  
Sectoral agreement stayers (control group) 2,224 ---   34,747 
Orienting leavers 1,740 1,781 -41*** 
88*** 
1,466 
Non-orienting leavers 1,404 1,533 -129*** 423 
      
Orienting stayers (control group) 1,762 ---   11,092 
Orienting joiners 1,777 1,781  -4  1,359 
    -69**  
Non-orienting stayers (control group) 1,516 ---   14,276 
Non-orienting joiners 1,489 1,424** 65**  549 
(b) Establishments Observed for Four Consecutive Years  
Sectoral agreement stayers (control group) 2,249 ---    25,121 
Orienting leavers 1,794 1,832 -38** 
131*** 
 581 
Non-orienting leavers 1,442 1,611 -169*** 133 
       
Orienting stayers (control group) 1,785 ---   6,656 
Orienting joiners 1,738 1,754 -16  354 
     -72  
Non-orienting stayers (control group) 1,532 ---   9,087 
Non-orienting joiners 1,422 1,366 56  183 
Notes: The establishment wage is defined as the real wage bill per full-time equivalent employee. 𝑤𝑡 
(𝑤𝑡
∗) denotes the observed (counterfactual) mean wage in t over all j units in the corresponding group. 
For example, the counterfactual wage of 1,781 Euros shown in the second column and second row of 
panel (a) gives the wage that an orienting leaver would obtain in t had that establishment stayed 
covered by a collective agreement in t-2, t-1, and t (rather than covered in t-2 and not covered but 
oriented in t-1 and t). The same procedure applies in respect of orienting joiners vis-à-vis orienting 
stayers and for non-orienting joiners vis-à-vis non-orienting stayers. Panel (b) has the same 
interpretation, except that in this case the selected establishments are observed for the four 
consecutive years t-3, t-2, t-1, and t.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. The results 
reported in the third column are derived from a mean comparison (one-tailed) test within a given group. 
Thus, for orienting leavers, for example, the null hypothesis is given by difference = mean (𝑤𝑗𝑡) – mean 
(𝑤𝑗𝑡
∗ ) = 0, against the alternative difference < 0, where j indexes a member of the group of orienting 
leavers; for joiners the alternative hypothesis is given by difference > 0. The (one-tailed) test provided in 
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the fourth column compares orienting versus non-orienting leavers and then orienting versus non-
orienting joiners. In the former, the null is given by difference (orienting leavers) – difference (non-
orienting leavers) = 0 against the alternative of a negative difference; in the latter, the null is given by 
difference (orienting joiners) – difference (non-orienting joiners) = 0, against the alternative of a positive 
difference. The selected establishments have at least one employee.  N, in the last column, denotes the 
sample size of the corresponding groups. 
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TABLE 8a  
OBSERVED AND COUNTERFACTUAL ESTABLISHMENT WAGES FOR ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE 
EMPLOYEES, 2000-2013 
 𝑤𝑡    𝑤𝑡
∗  
Mean comparison 
(within groups) 
Mean comparison 
(across groups) 
N 
Sectoral agreement stayers (control group) 2,282 ---   32,484 
Orienting leavers 1,888 1,919 -31** 
78** 
1,197 
Non-orienting leavers 1,657 1,766 -109** 267 
      
Orienting stayers (control group) 1,877 ---   9,330 
Orienting joiners 1,889 1,895 -6  1,116 
    -53*  
Non-orienting stayers (control group) 1,748 ---   10,024 
Non-orienting joiners 1,606 1,559 47*  371 
Notes: The selected establishments were observed for three consecutive years, t-2, t-1, and t. See notes 
to Table 7. 
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TABLE 8b 
OBSERVED AND COUNTERFACTUAL ESTABLISHMENT WAGES FOR ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST ONE EMPLOYEE IN MANUFACTURING AND 
SERVICES, 2000-2013 
 
Manufacturing Services 
 
𝑤𝑡    𝑤𝑡
∗  
Mean comparison 
(within groups) 
Mean comparison 
(across groups) 
N 𝑤𝑡    𝑤𝑡
∗  
Mean comparison 
(within groups) 
Mean comparison 
(across groups) 
N 
Sectoral agreement stayers (control group) 2,249 ---   12,241 2,210 ---   22,506 
Orienting leavers 1,741 1,783 -42** 
124** 
579 1,739 1,780 -41** 
74** 
887 
Non-orienting leavers 1,399 1,565 -166** 119 1,405 1,520 -115*** 304 
           
Orienting stayers (control group) 1,804 ---   4,765 1,715 ---   6,237 
Orienting joiners 1,626 1,646 -20  552 1,881 1,875 6  807 
    -69*     -60  
Non-orienting stayers (control group) 1,506 ---   4,502 1,521 ---   9,774 
Non-orienting joiners 1,504 1,455 49  171 1,482 1,410 72**  378 
Notes: The selected establishments were observed for three consecutive years, t-2, t-1, and t, over 2000-2013. See notes to Table 7. 
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TABLE 8c 
OBSERVED AND COUNTERFACTUAL ESTABLISHMENT WAGES FOR ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST ONE EMPLOYEE, 2000-2006 AND 2007-2013 
 
2000-2006 2007-2013 
𝑤𝑡    𝑤𝑡
∗  
Mean comparison 
(within groups) 
Mean comparison 
(across groups)) 
N 𝑤𝑡    𝑤𝑡
∗  
Mean comparison 
(within groups) 
Mean comparison 
(across groups) 
N 
Sectoral agreement stayers (control group) 2,252 ---   15,692 2,192 ---   13,260 
Orienting leavers 1,801 1,802 -1 
89** 
658 1,683 1,764 -81*** 
126** 
561 
Non-orienting leavers 1,496 1,586 -90* 219 1,272 1,478 -206*** 111 
           
Orienting stayers (control group) 1,824 ---   3,770 1,720 ---   5,504 
Orienting joiners 1,844 1,863 -19  687 1,688 1,674 14  447 
    -83     -36  
Non-orienting stayers (control group) 1,571 ---   6,835 1,472 ---   6,835 
Non-orienting joiners 1,547 1,483 64*  140 1,346 1,296 50  140 
Notes: The selected establishments were observed for three consecutive years, t-2, t-1, and t. See notes to Table 7. 
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FIGURE 1  
WAGE GROWTH PROFILE OF ESTABLISHMENTS COVERED/NOT COVERED BY A SECTORAL 
AGREEMENT VERSUS SECTORAL AGREEMENT LEAVERS AND JOINERS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  We observe the selected establishment groups in the three consecutive years t-2, t-1, and t, 
and for each group we compute the wage growth between t-2 and t-1 and between t-1 and t, where 
t-1 is the switching year. The wage in each group is set at 100 in year t-2 so that each line gives the 
group-specific wage growth over time, that is, one and two years after establishments in the group 
are first observed.  The establishment wage is defined as the wage bill per full-time equivalent 
employee (see notes to Table 6). The sample period is 2000-2013. 
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FIGURE 2 
WAGE GROWTH PROFILE OF ESTABLISHMENTS COVERED/NOT COVERED BY A SECTORAL 
AGREEMENT VERSUS SECTORAL AGREEMENT LEAVERS AND JOINERS 
 
 
 
dfsadfdsf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  We observe the selected establishment groups in the four consecutive years t-3, t-2, t-1, and 
t, and for each group we compute the wage growth between t-3 and t-2, between t-2 and t-1, and 
between t-1 and t, where t-2 is the switching year. The wage in each group is set at 100 in year t-3 so 
that each line gives the group-specific wage growth over time, that is, one, two, and three years after 
establishments in the group are first observed.  The establishment wage is defined as the wage bill 
per full-time equivalent employee (see notes to Table 6).The sample period is 2000-2013. 
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APPENDIX 
SAMPLE INDUSTRIES AND THEIR 2-DIGIT COMPONENTS, BEFORE AND AFTER THE SIC CHANGES OF 2009 
  
Industry  
2-digit industry classification 
2000-2008 2009-2013 
Manufacturing 
 
Manufacture of food products 
Manufacture of textiles and clothing, tanning and dressing of leather 
Manufacture of paper products, printing, publishing 
Manufacture of wood products 
Manufacture of chemicals, coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Manufacture of basic metals 
Recycling 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products and structural metal 
products 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
Manufacture of electrical equipment, office machinery and 
computers 
Manufacture of precision and optical equipment 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, musical instruments, sports 
goods, games and toys and other products 
Manufacture of food products 
Manufacture of textiles and clothing, tanning and dressing of leather 
Manufacture of wood products paper, print products 
Manufacture of chemicals, coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Manufacture of basic metals 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products (not including machinery and 
equipment) and structural metal products 
Manufacture of electrical equipment, office machinery and computers 
Manufacture of precision and optical equipment 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, musical instruments, sports goods, games and 
toys and other products 
Reparation of machinery installation equipment 
 
Construction Building of complete constructions or parts 
Building installation and building completion 
Building construction and civil engineering 
Building installation and building completion 
Trade, Transport, 
and Finance 
 
Sales, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
retail service of automotive fuel 
Wholesale and commission trade 
Retail trade, repair of personal and household goods 
Transport 
Communication 
Central Banking 
Insurance and pension funding 
Sales, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
Wholesale and commission trade 
Retail Trade, petrol stations 
Transport and Warehousing car parks, railway stations, additional carriage, postal-, 
courier-, express mail service 
Information, Communication publishing, film production, rental, distribution, 
broadcasting service, telecommunication in 
 
Business 
Services/Industry 
Services 
 
Computer and related activities 
Research and development 
Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities, advertising, 
market research 
Real estate activities 
Real estate activities 
Legal and tax advice, accounting 
Administration, leadership of establishments, consulting 
Architecture and engineering offices, technical, physical, chemical support 
Research and development 
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Renting and business activities 
 
Marketing and market research, design, photography, translation 
Veterinary industry 
Renting and business activities 
Placement and temporary provision of labor 
Hawking, security agencies, landscaping, other economic services 
Other Services Hotel and restaurants 
Education 
Human help, veterinary and social work activities 
Sewage and refusal disposal, sanitation and similar activities 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
Other services 
Hotel Business and Gastronomy 
Financial and Insurance services Industrial services 
Human Health 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
Other services (laundry/hairdressing) 
 
 
 
 
